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The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has pro-
posedmethodsfor incorporating consideration ofmarket
risks-exchange rate, interest rate, and equity price risks
-into risk-based capital standardsfor banks. This paper
shows that the separate andseemingly differentproposed
approaches to the three sourcesofriskare consistentwith
one another, reflecting a single unifying theme. That theme
is the measurement of risk through a weighting of two
different measures ofportfolio size, the grossposition and
the netposition. A simple theoretical model demonstrates
that such an approach can be viewed as a simple (specifi-
cally, an affine) approximation to a portfolio variance
calculation based on the full variance-covariance matrix
ofmarketreturns, andthusprovidesa reasonable basisfor
a practical approach to capital standards. An empirical
test of one part of the framework, the proposal for ex-
change rate risk, shows that the approximation may be
very accurate: theproposedBasle approach capturesover
95percentofthe variation inforeign exchange riskacross
a sample of banks from the Twelfth Federal Reserve
District.
This paper investigates the extension ofrisk-based capital
standards to cover market-related risks. In 1988, the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basle Commit-
tee) published standards for capital adequacy, establishing
a system in which minimum capital requirements for
bankingfirms are sensitive to differences inrisk.! Therisk-
basedcapital standards specified in the Basle Accord came
into full force at the endof1992, and have beenadopted by
manycountries. Whenthe standardswere issued, theBasle
Committee acknowledged that the resulting assignments
of minimum capital primarily reflected an assessment of
creditrisk, orthe riskoflosses dueto counterpartydefault.
Consideration of other types of risk was left to national
regulatory authorities or to future deliberationsofthe Basle
Committee and its subgroups.
In April 1993, the Basle Committee sought comments
on a consultative paper describing proposals for incor-
porating additional types of risk into the original frame-
work (Basle Committee, 1993). "Market risks" are those
due to unexpected changes in financial market prices that
are unrelated to the creditworthiness of particular bor-
rowers or counterparties; the Basle proposals cover stock
prices, the prices of foreign currencies as reflected in
exchange rates, and debt prices as reflected in interest
rates. Since market risk is considered distinct from credit
risk, the emphasis is on price fluctuations that reflect
general market movements, rather than those related to
changes in the condition ofspecific issuers.
This paper develops a conceptual model in which the
new market risk proposals can be understood and ana-
lyzed. The underlying, unifying theme ofthe standards is
emphasized. Building on the conceptual model, the suit-
ability of the proposals is evaluated. For purposes of
illustration, much ofthe analysis is basedon consideration
of foreign exchange rate risk, which in some ways is the
simplest of the three; the paper discusses the parallel
implications for other types of market risk in less detail.
1. The Basle Committee consists of representatives from Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It
usually meets at the Bank: for International Settlements in Basle,
Switzerland.4 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
II. CONVENTIONAL AND RISK-BASED
CAPITAL STANDARDS
Before turning to market risk, it is helpful to review the
general role ofcapital standards in bank supervision. Risk
is an unavoidable element ofthe business ofbanking, and
banks must take risks to be economically useful in the
financial system. Managers ofwell-run banks are aware of
the risks they face, and take steps to manage those risks to
maximize the net value of their banks. However, certain
features of the banking system-most notably the imper-
fectly priced government support ofbanks through deposit
insurance and other elements ofthe federal "safety net,"
and the externalities associated with bank failures-lead
to a tendency toward excessive risk. Levels of risk are
"excessive" to the extent that the probability of bank
failure resulting from the private, unregulated decisions of
bank managers exceeds the level offailure that maximizes
social welfare. To deal with this tendency toward excessive
risk, central authorities in most countries impose some
type ofoversight on the banking system in speciallicens-
ing, regulation, and ongoing supervision.
Standards for capital adequacy are an aspect of bank
regulation common to most countries. These capital stan-
dards establish minimums for bank capital. The term
"capital" is used in many ways in economics and finance,
butinthe contextofbank capital adequacy it is the portion
of a bank's financing that can absorb losses that would
otherwise cause the bank to fail and impose an external
coston the economy. Generallythis means equity, although
regulators consider certain types of debt to be capital in
some circumstances.
Minimumcapitalrequirements help ensure the solvency
ofregulated institutions, but the only capital standard that
can guarantee solvency is a requirement of complete
equity financing. Such a standard is impossible with
depository institutions by definition, so regulators in-
stead set capital standards to reduce the probability of
insolvency to some acceptable level. The acceptable level
depends on regulators' tolerance for risk, which in tum
may reflectjudgmentsregarding the potential welfare costs
of insolvency balanced against the costs imposed by the
regulations.
The probability that a bank will become insolvent de-
pends on the level ofits capital and the variance orstandard
deviation of changes in that capital. The conventional
approach to capital adequacy sets minimum capital rela-
tive to the assets of the bank, with a floor placed under
allowable capital-asset ratios. Under certain assumptions,
such an asset-based standard is equivalent to requiring
capital to exceed a multiple of the standard deviation of
changes in capital. Specifically, ifall bank assets have the
same variance, and provided liabilities contribute trivially
ifat all to total risk, then the standard deviation ofchanges
in capital can be expressed as (J"AA, where (JA is the
standarddeviationofabank'sreturnon assets. Inthatcase,
a minimum capital ratio of "f(JA can set the probability of
insolvency at the acceptable level, withthecoverageratio 'Y
determined by regulators. If (J"A is about 2 percent (a
typical empirical finding) and regulators aim to cover two
standard deviations (that is, r = 2), then the minimum
capital ratio should be 4 percent.2
In contrast to conventional asset-based leverage con-
straints, the risk-based capital standards established under
the 1988 Basle Accord set minimum capital relative to a
weighted sum ofthe bank's assets. 3 Levonian and Kendall
(1993) show within a simplified model ofthe Basle Accord
thatthe creditrisk standards canbe viewed as an extension
of simple leverage standards; the Accord relaxes the as-
sumption that all asset types have a common variance,
making (JA a weighted average of the volatilities of the
different asset types. However, the Basle Accord retains
the assumption that liabilities are irrelevant, and the risk
weights largely reflect only credit risk.
m. MARKET RISKS IN THEORY
Neither the conventional nor the credit-risk-based ap-
proaches to capital standards can be stretched to cover
market risks. Credit risks generally run in one direction:
The bank gains if the credit standing of a counterparty
improves, and loses ifcredit quality deteriorates. On the
2. An asset-based standard ignores differences in bank profitability,
implicitly assuming that the expected change in capital is zero. In
practice, regulators aim to err on the side of conservatism, and are
reluctant to presume that banks will achieve a positive rate of return.
Bank supervision may incorporate profitability more subtly, perhaps in
the enforcement of capital standards; for example, supervisors might
exert less pressure on a profitable bank with low capital than on an
unprofitable bank in the same position.
3. The Basle framework applies to assets and off-balance-sheet items.
The notional value of a bank's off-balance-sheet exposures are con-
verted into "credit equivalent" amounts through a set of conversion
factors intended to reflect the amounts actually at risk for the bank; on-
balance-sheet assets are combinedwith the converted off-balance-sheet
amounts and classified into one of several categories according to the
credit risk associated with the underlying counterparties. Amounts in
eachriskcategory are then multiplied by arisk weighting factor (higher
for riskier categories) and the weighted amounts are summed. The
resulting total risk-weighted assets forms the basis for the capital
adequacy calculation; minimum ratios of various types of capital to
risk-weighted assets are established in the Basle Accord. For further
description of the standards established under the Basle Accord, see
Bhala (1989).other hand, increases in market prices can cause either
gainsorlosses for a bank, becauseexposure to these prices
can be either long or short.4 Liabilities create short posi-
tions; for example, a deposit denominated in a foreign
currency creates short foreign exchange exposure for the
issuingbank. Since suchpositions may contributesubstan-
tially (eitherpositively ornegatively)to total portfoliorisk,
liabilities cannot be ignored, and a simple asset-based
calculationcannotcorrectlycapturethe potentialfor losses
due to market risk.
Withrisky positions both long andshort, the variance of
changes in capital requires a matrix presentation. Suppose
there areN market variables-stockprices, interestrates,
orexchangerates-thatmightaffectthe solvencyofbanks.
LetI represent the variance-covariance matrix ofpercent-
age changes in the prices of these instruments; thus I is
N x N, with the variance ofeach instrument on the diago-
nal, and the covariance betweeneachpairoffthe diagonal.
LetD representa vectorofthe bank'snetdollarpositions in
the instruments, withNcomponents. Thenthebank's port-
folio variance-that is, the variance ofthe change in total
portfolio value-is given by (J"~=D'ID.
It is tempting to regard this matrix-based portfolio
calculation as the solution to the market risk problem.
Regulators could set minimum capital at some multiple 'Y
of the portfolio standard deviation (J"p' at a level deemed
adequate for protection against bank failures. Such stand-
ards would accurately reflect differences in risk across
banks and over time.
However, practicalconsiderations mayrequire standards
for marketriskto meetadditional criteria. Foremostamong
these is simplicity; the more complicated the regulation,
the greater the expense, for several reasons. Complex
standards are more difficult to draft, and once written are
more difficult to explain to regulatedbanks, to supervisory
staff, and to others. Complicated standards often are
information intensive, increasing the reporting burden
imposed on banks and raising the costs of data collection
and analysis for regulators. Banks and regulators also may
find it more difficult to monitor compliance. Moreover, to
the extentthat more complicated methods rely on sophisti-
catedcomputationaltechniques, oronunobservablevalues
that must be estimated or subjectively determined, en-
forcement costs are likely to climb.
4. Positions are defined as "long" ifarise in price increases the value of
the portfolio; this might occur ifthe bank actually holds the currency,
bond, or stock, or has contracts to receive delivery of those items at
some future date at a prespecified price. Conversely, "short" positions
lose value when price rises; shorts generallyresultfrom commitments to
make future delivery.
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One aspect of simplicity is that elementary functional
forms are desirable. Linear forms are among the simplest,
and therefore are preferred. Regulators also may want any
new capital standards to have the general form of the old
standards, underwhich minimumcapital is setas aratio to
some measureofvalue suchas total assets orrisk-weighted
assets. Requiring that a market risk standard be expressed
similarly places even greater constraints on the functional
form than does the requirementthat itbelinear. The history
ofthe Basle Committee's work suggests that these consid-
erations were important. Of course, simplicity cannot be
the only goal in establishing a capital standard; the stand-
ard also must be accurate, with risk measured fairly
precisely. An optimal policy balances these concerns,
trading off simplicity for precision. A degree of impreci-
sion may be acceptable when the cost of implementing
more precise but more complex regulatory regimes is
considered.
Viewed within the context of this tradeoff, the matrix-
based portfolio variance calculation is precise but is un-
likely to be simple enough. The policy challenge is to
develop a precise measure of market-related risks-with
precision measured relative to portfolio variance-that is
sufficiently simple, preferably one that results in a dollar
figure against which a typical minimum capital ratio can
be applied. To meet this challenge, the Basle Committee
began by examining existing approaches in use by bank
supervisors around the world. Ofthe various market risks,
foreign exchange is the one for which regulators have
developed the best quantitative measures ofexposure. The
next section discusses the range ofexisting practice exam-
ined by the Basle Committee.
IV FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET RISK
IN PRACTICE
In many countries, banks are required to calculate their
overall currency positions at given points in time; regula-
tors use the resulting "aggregate open position" for each
bankas a measureofexchange rate risk. Implicitly, regula-
tors assume that foreign exchange risk depends positively
on the size ofthis open position, analogous to the assump-
tion in conventional capital standards that portfolio risk is
proportional to total assets. Such calculations are basedon
the vector of positions D, and do not explicitly use the
matrixI. Since portfolio variance depends on bothD and
I,itis reasonable to think thatthese openpositioncalcula-
tions might be related to risk, but with a loose and
imperfect linkage.
Each ofthe various aggregation approaches in common
use begins by constructing a hypothetical portfolio of6 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
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shorts as positive POSItIons. Thus, the gross measure
is GAP=L+5, whereas the net measure is NAP=T=
IL- 51. Fromthe definitions, itis evidentthat GAP;;:::NAP,
and GAP= NAP only ifL=O or5=0.
foreign currency positions for each bank, or a foreign
exchange "book," with risk identical to the bank as a
whole. For some banks this mirrors the way exposure
actually is managed: Each business unit within the bank
hedges away any currencyriskitgenerates throughinternal
transactions with the bank's foreign exchange trading
desk. However, the same principle applies whether or not
this is actually done. With all ofthe relevant risk collapsed
into a single actual or hypothetical book, the problem
becomes one ofcomputing the total exposure arising from
this foreign exchange portfolio. Long and short positions
generally are netted within any single currency, but na-
tional practices differ in important ways with regard to the
degreeofnettingoflong andshortpositions across curren-
cies. Three alternative approaches for netting across cur-
rencies to obtain a measure ofaggregate open position are
in common use by bank supervisors in major countries.
To illustrate the three alternatives, simple schematic
diagrams of two foreign exchange books are presented in
Figure 1. The relative dimensions ofthe rectangles reflect
the relative values of the long (L) and short (5) positions,
and the net portfolio position (T), all in terms of the
domestic currency. In Portfolio I the aggregate value of
long positions exceeds the aggregate value of short posi-
tions, and the foreign exchange book is a net asset for the
bank; inPortfolioIIthe shortpositions are worthmorethan
the longs, and the book is a net liability. What is a valid
measure of exposure to exchange rate changes for these
portfolios?
Oneintuitivelyappealingmeasureofpotentialloss is the
net position, which is simply equal to T in Figure 1. This
reflects the net investment of the bank in the foreign
exchange book ata pointin time, orthe costofacquiring or
divesting the portfolio on the current market. The net
position has been used by some regulators as the measure
offoreign exchangeexposure, mostnotablyinJapan; itwill
bereferred to here as Net Aggregate Position (NAP). NAP
alsocanbe computedas the absolute value ofthe sumofall
foreign currency positions, counting shorts as negative
values.
However, suppose the long exposure is in Canadian dol-
lars and the short exposure is in German marks. If the
dollar exchange rates for these two currencies move in
opposite directions, the bank's total loss could far exceed
T;for example, the netpositionmightchangefrom positive
to negative. Consequently, some regulators have chosen to
assess exposureby taking the total ofthe two areasLand5;
this measure has been used in Germany and other coun-
tries. This will bereferred to as Gross Aggregate Position
(GAP). GAP is calculated as the sum ofthe values of all
long positions, plus the absolute value of all short posi-
tions; thatis, it is the sumofall foreign currenciescountingA third practical gauge of foreign exchange exposure,
generally attributed to bank regulators in the U.K. but
adopted by other countries as well, is the larger of the
absolute values of shorts and longs. This "Hank of Eng-
land" Aggregate Position, or HAP, is therefore max[L,S].
As the largerofLandS, HAP is always the "length" ofthe
T-account balance sheet, the total value of one side; in
PortfolioI, thiswouldbeL, whereasinPortfolioIIitwould
be S. An alternative definition of BAP that is sometimes
used is "the sum of short positions in all currencies,
including the home currency." The equivalence ofthe two
definitions is clear from Figure 1. The rectangular area T
gives the net position in the domestic currency, which in
Portfolio I can be viewed as additional short exposure: If
the domestic currency rises in value against other curren-
cies, thevalue ofthe bookdeclines. HenceinPortfolioIthe
short position including the home currency is the total area
ofrectangles S and T together, which is ofcourse equal to
L, the larger of Land S. Similarly, in Portfolio II the
domesticcurrencypositioneffectivelyis along position, so
the aggregate short position is simply S; this again is
equivalent to taking the larger ofLand S.
Eachmeasure-NAP, GAP, andHAP-wasconsidered
and tested by the Hasle Committee; in the end, the Com-
mittee favored HAP. The Hasle Committee perceived HAP
to be a compromise between the "conservative" GAP and
the "liberal" NAP. In fact, it is a compromise in a very
significant sense: HAP is the simple average ofGAP and
NAP. To see this, first note that:
(1) GAP = L + S = max[L,S] + min[L,S]
NAP = IL - sl = max[L,S] - min[L,S]
Then HAP can be written as:
(2) HAP = max[L,S]
Yz (max[L,S] + max[L,S])
= Y2 (max[L,S] + min[L,S]
+ max[L,S] - min[L,S])
Y2 (GAP + NAP)
An equivalent restatement is that HAP always yields a
result halfway between the gross and net exposures. Thus
HAP is indeed a "compromise" measure.5
NAP, GAP, andHAP canbeviewedas variants ofamore
general measure of portfolio position. Define "weighted
aggregate position" (WAP) as the weighted sum ofgross
and net aggregate positions:
(3) WAP = wgGAP + wnNAP
5. The relation BAP=Yz(GAP+NAP) is also evident from Figure 1.
Since GAP + NAPis equal tothesumofL, S, andT, itistwice the value
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The other measures are easily seen to be special cases:
GAP ifwg = 1 and wn=O
(4) WAP = NAPifwg =Oandwn=l
HAP ifW = Y2 and W = Yz g n
Turning from risk measurement to the construction of
capital standards, a capital requirement for foreign ex-
change risk could be based on WAP. Aminimum ratio cof
capital to aggregate foreign exchange position could be
established, with position measured by HAP or any other
variant of WAP. This is precisely the Hasle Committee's
proposal: banks would be required to have enough capital
(above that required to cover other types ofrisk) to cover
8 percent of HAP.6 As indicated in Section II, to be
adequate this minimum capital should correspond to "Wp ,
where (Tp is the standarddeviation ofchanges incapital (in
this case flowing entirely from the foreign exchange port-
folio) and 'Y is regulators' desired coverage ratio.
V. EQUITY AND INTEREST RATE
RISK PROPOSALS
The recent Hasle release also covers equity price risk and
interest rate risk. The equity proposal applies to banks'
holdings of common equity shares, as well as options,
futures, warrants, and other instruments whose value de-
pends on share prices or the level ofstock market indexes.
The interest rate proposal applies to traded debt securities
andderivatives; as a result, itonlyincorporates aportionof
total interest rate risk, ignoring majorcomponents such as
loans and deposits.7 This section provides an overview of
both proposals. As with foreign exchange, these two pro-
posals tum out to be versions ofWAP.
Onenotable difference between thesetwo proposals and
the foreign exchange proposal is that they substitute com-
pletely for the old treatment; that is, traded debt and equity
instruments would no longer be covered by the original
ofeitherside ofthe balance sheet separately; BAP is always equal to the
total value ofone side ofthe balance sheet, and hence is always exactly
half of the sum ofthe other two measures.
6. The Basle Committeealso has suggestedapossiblealternative, under
which banks would simulate the response of their portfolios to typical
exchange rate fluctuations.
7. A separate proposal from the Basle Committee describes a frame-
work for collecting information on interest rate exposure for all of the
assets and liabilities ofthe bank, both on- and off-balance-sheet. That
framework is for information only; there is no explicitriskcalculationor
capital charge, although the Committee expects that the information
may be used as the foundation for future capital standards covering the
bank as a whole.8 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
risk-based capital framework. Capital required under the
foreign exchange market risk proposal would be in addi-
tion to any capital required to meet the existing credit risk
standards.
Equity Price Risk
The equity proposal covers risk due to changes in stock
prices. Some banks have directholdings ofequity shares or
equity-linked instruments. In some countries this could be
quite important, depending on the extent ofbank powers.
Also, the new standards apply on a consolidated basis; in
countries (such as the United States) where banks are
affiliated with brokerage or investment banking units, the
equity risk standards may be important.
As in the foreign exchange proposal, banks convert
options and futures into spotequivalents, andthen consoli-
date all exposures into a single hypothetical portfolio. The
result in the foreign exchange case was a set of long and
shortpositions inindividualcurrencies;for theequitycase,
the positions arein the shares ofdifferentissuers orinstock
market indexes. Positions may be long or short in each
equity, with shortexposure arising from shortsales orfrom
short positions in derivative instruments.
The proposal uses the long and short positions to com-
pute gross and net aggregate positions, GAP and NAP.
Gross and net positions are then weighted and summed to
set minimum capital. This obviously is a weighted aggre-
gate position calculation ofthe form discussed above. The
weights proposed by the Basle Committee are 1.0 and 1.0,
unless the portfolio is well diversified, in which case the
weights are 1.0 on NAP and 0.5 on GAP. The resulting
aggregate position is multiplied by a minimum capital ra-
tio of8 percent. The Basle draft combines the capital ratio
with the weights; for example, the weights for the diver-
sified portfolio case are expressed as 8 percent ofnet and
4 percent of gross. The Basle document refers to the
composite weight on GAP as "x" and the weight on NAP
as "y," and calls this "thex plus y approach." It clearly is
equivalent to WAP.
Interest Rate Risk
The traded debt securities proposal is much more compli-
cated, andhas somefeatures thatdo not fit neadywithinthe
WAP framework. As with the other market risks, a hypo-
thetical portfolio is constructed: Whereas in the foreign
exchange case the positions were in individual currencies,
and in equities the positions corresponded to different
issuers or indexes, in the debt proposal banks report net
positions in different maturities or repricing periods. De-
rivative instruments are convertedto spotequivalents, and
duration weights are used to convert each time band to a
corresponding interest rate sensitivity. In addition, each
position is multiplied by a risk weight that combines an
interest rate volatility (standard deviation) and a factor for
the number ofstandard deviations ofcapital coverage de-
siredby regulators; in terms ofthediscussion in Section II
above, the risk weights correspond to "to'.
Banks report long or short positions in each of the 13
bands, \vhich are grouped into three "zones" correspond-
ing to short-term, medium-term, and long-term. Table 1
illustrates the structure of the basic maturity ladder. Ex-
posures are netted in stages, first within maturity bands,
then across bands within each ofthe three maturity zones,
and then finally across the zones. At each stage, a certain
amount of the netting is "disallowed," using various
"disallowance factors." An aggregate position results.
Since individual positions have been premultiplied by risk
weights corresponding to "tIT, the result after the netting
process is not multiplied by a capital ratio (such as 8 per-
cent); it already corresponds to a dollar amount ofcapital.
The way the disallowances are computed turns the
nettingprocess intoaWAP calculation. Considerone stage
of the netting, say, between time bands within a single
zone. In each band the bank may have either a long or a
shortposition. (Forexample, therewouldbeamaximumof
TABLE 1
MATURITY LADDER FOR INTEREST RATE RISK
TIME BAND MATURITY RANGE ZONE
0-1 month
2 1-3 months Zone 1









10 7-10 years Zone 3
11 10-15 years (Long Tenn)
12 15-20years
13 over 20 yearssix long or short positions in Zone 3.) These band ex-
posures are netted, generating a NAP for that zone. The
disallowance factor is a number 0 (between 0.10 and 1.50,
differingby zone and band) to bemultiplied by the smaller
of the total long and total short positions; the resulting
dollar-value disallowance is addedtoNAPfromthe zoneto
compute a position for that zone. Formally, the calculation
is NAP+omin[L,S].
It may not be obvious that this is a WAP calculation.
Note from the pair ofequations in (1) that GAP- NAP=
2min[L,S]. Then the computed position is:
(5) NAP + omin[L,S] = NAP + ~ (GAP- NAP)
= ~ GAP + (1 - ~ )NAP
Equation (5) shows that the netting process with dis-
allowances does yield WAP. The amount of the disallow-
ance is related to the weighting: a larger disallowance
factor gives relatively more weight to gross versus net.
Note that 8= 0 corresponds to NAP, 8= I corresponds to
BAP, and 8= 2 corresponds to GAP.
Thus, the equity and interest rate risk proposals reflect
the same underlying theme as the foreign exchange pro-
posal: The use ofWAP to weight gross and net aggregate
positions, yielding a dollar exposure against which a
minimum capital ratio can be applied. Since all three use
versions of WAP, WAP is the key to understanding and
analyzing the market risk proposals. The next section
returns to the example of exchange rate risk to examine
whetherWAP is likelyto bea goodmeasureofmarketrisk.
VI. WAP IN A SIMPLIFIED PORTFOLIO
WAP is a simple, practical measure ofportfolio position,
linearlycombiningelementsofthepositionvectorD. WAP
has the distinct advantages ofreadiness ofcomprehension
andeaseofapplication, as do its variants, suchas theBasle
Committee's foreign exchange selection BAP. Moreover,
WAP could serve as the foundation for a proportional
standard, withminimumcapital setatsomeratio crelative
to WAP. Butsince WAP bearslittleobviousresemblanceto
the portfolio variance (I~ = D'""i.D discussed in Section III,
its precision-thatis, its ability to accurately reflect inter-
bank differences in risk-may seem questionable. This
section presents a simplified model ofa portfolio showing
thatGAPandNAP, thecomponentsofWAP, areclearlyre-
latedtotheportfoliovariance calculatedfromthevariance-
covariance matrix;thisresulthas implicationsfor the likely
precision of WAP in general. Foreign exchange risk is
again used as a convenientexample, although the currency
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positions could just as easily be interpreted as debt or
equity positions.
Consider a U.S. bank managing aportfolio ofN foreign
currencies. Assume that the portfolio consists of n short
currency positions, and therefore N - n long currencies.
The value of each currency is measured in units of the
domestic currency (the U.S. dollar) as numeraire; thus,
there are N+1 total currencies in the model. The dollar
value ofcurrency i in the portfolio is di-
Prices ofthe foreign currencies fluctuate randomly from
period to period due to changes in supply and demand,
perhaps with some anticipated trend. Assume that the
unanticipated rate of change in each of the N exchange
rates is distributed with variance (I2, and that all cross-
currency correlations are equal to p. IfD is theN x 1 vec-
tor of positions and ""i. is the N x N variance-covariance
matrix of the rates of change in exchange rates-with
diagonal elements equal to (I2 and off-diagonal elements
equal to p(I2-then the variance ofchanges in the value of
the foreign exchange portfolio is given by:
N N-[ N
(6) (I~ = D'""i.D = ;~, (I2df + 2 ;~, ;-~, (I2 pdidj •
~-.I. 1--'" J-" ''''
To simplify the problem further, assume that each position
is of equal absolute dollar value.8 Long positions have
positive value di= d>O and total dollar value (N- n)d,
whereas shortpositions are effectivelyliabilities andhence
have di=-d<O and negative total value -nd. Then the
variance can be written:9
(7) (I~ = (I2d2N(1- p) + (I2d2(N - 2n)2p.
Defining a "portfolio composition factor" Pas:
(8) P = Yd2N(1-p) + d2(N-2n)2p,
the portfolio variance can be written simply as:
(9) (I~ = (I2P2.
An attractive interpretation ofthis expression for (I~ is
that foreign exchange risk in a bank's portfolio can be
viewed as the productoftwo components. Onecomponent
is exchange rate volatility arising from the external en-
vironment ofthe foreign exchange markets, in this model
represented by (I2. This variance is multiplied by the
secondcomponent, thesquareofthe portfoliocomposition
factor P, which reflects the size and composition of the
individual bank's foreign exchange book. Since the ex-
change rate environmentdoes not vary across banks within
8. Alternatively, (Ii could be pennitted to vary across currencies and di
assumed proportional to 1/(Ii (that is, smallerpositions in more volatile
currencies).
9. Details ofthis step are given in the Appendix.10 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
a given financial system, the value of0"2 affects the level of
risk in the system but not how risk varies across banks;
differences inriskacross banksmuststemfrom differences
in portfolio composition.
P is related algebraically to the simpler aggregate posi-
tion measures used by bank supervisors around the world.
Inthe N foreign currency model, GAP= Nd. With n short
positions and N-n long, NAP= IN- 2nId. Substituting
into equation (8) above yiehk
(10) p2 = GAp2 (1 ~p) + NAp2p .
Thus p2 is a weighted sum ofsquares ofGAP and NAP,
with the weights depending on cross-currency correlations
ofexchange rates for any given number ofcurrencies.
In view of this relationship, consider the WAP meas-
ures-GAP, NAP and BAP-that have been used in the
past to measure risk. A precise standard would set mini-
mum capital at 'YO"p' which is equal to 'YO"P from equation
(9). IfWAP happened to be proportional to P, then mini-
mum capital could be set as a ratio to WAP, with 'Y and 0"
incorporated into the capital ratio. Such a standard would
beprecise, in the sense that itwouldmeasureriskcorrectly
for any combination of NAP and GAP, and at the same
time would be simple. Is any variant ofWAP proportional
toP?
Several special cases are interesting. Equation (10)
impliesthatP = NAPifp= 1, an intuitiveresult: Ifchanges
in exchange rates are perfectly correlated, then the foreign
currencies are effectively interchangeable, and can be
treated as a single currency. Long and short positions
within a single currency ofcourse should be netted. As a
result, NAP, which nets longs and shorts across the entire
book, treats the exposures correctly. With p= 1, a mini-
mumcapital ratioc= 'YO" appliedto NAPis simple, propor-
tional, and precise. (This result is independent of the
particular form ofthe model.)
If exchange rate changes are uncorrelated (p = 0), then
equation (10) implies P = GAP/VFi.Inthatcase, acapital
standard for foreign exchange risk could be based on GAP
asthe measureofexposure, with the minimumcapitalratio
c='Y0"1VFi. The special case ofNAP=0 also is interest-
ing; NAPis zeroifabankruns a "balancedbook," withno
net position in the domestic currency. GAP again is pre-
cisely proportional to portfolio risk: equation (10) shows
thatP = GAPY(1- p)1N. The appropriateminimumcapi-
tal ratio would be c= 'YO"Y(1- p)1N.
Nevertheless, itis clearfrom (10) that in general a WAP
standard cannot be perfectly precise, because WAP de-
pends linearly on GAP and NAP while P depends on the
square root oftheir weighted sum ofsquares.Ifa standard
based on a weighted root sum ofsquares ofgross and net
exposure were regarded as sufficiently simple, p.itself
could yield a very precise capital standard. However, such
a standard may be regarded as unacceptably complex.
Given that the simpler WAP is imprecise,it still may be
"close enough" to P to be acceptable.
Equation (10) describes P as a function ofnet and gross
exposure; in three dimensions, P is a portion ofanasym-
metric cone. In contrast, WAP is affine;lO it is a plane in
three dimensions. The task ofdevising a capital standard
based on WAP can be viewed as one of choosing the
weights to make the WAP plane approximate the P cone
fairly closelyfor all nandd, giventhenumberofcurrencies
N and the correlation coefficient p. As discussed above,
WAP can fit P perfectly only under polar conditions, with
p= 0 or p= 1. In the general case, WAP can only be made
"close" toP; the fit ofthe capitalstandardis tailoredby ad-
justing the relative weights on net and gross exposures, Wn
andwg • The best weighting will dependinpartonNand p.
VII. OPTIMIZING THE WAP WEIGHTS
TheprecedingsectionsuggestedthatWAP mightbe agood
risk measure, balancing simplicity and precision: simple
because it builds on current practice and is a linear com-
binationofexposures, andprecise because acorrectchoice
ofthe relative weights on gross and net could make WAP
approximate the theoretically correct portfolio composi-
tion factor. The Basle Committee's foreign exchange pro-
posal incorporates a specific weighting, BAP, in which the
weights on NAP and GAP are both liz. Are these the best
choices? More generally, how should the weights be
chosen?
Returning to the simple portfolio model with a .fixed
numberN offoreign currencies and a variance-covariance
matrix~, assume that bank portfolios differ only in scale.
That is, assume that all banks have the same currency mix
(reflected in uniform values of n, or equivalently in uni-
form ratios of NAP to GAP), but may have positions of
different sizes (ddiffers). LetAbe the commonNAPIGAP
ratio; A reflects the degree of portfolio imbalance, with
A= 0 for a balanced portfolio, and A= 1 ifexposure is all
long or all short. 11 All bank currency portfolios thus lie
along a single ray with slope A in the NAP-GAP plane,
10. An affine function is the multidimensional equivalent of a linear
function; a function/is affine if/(x)=Ax+b. where x is a vector of
variables, bis avectorofconstants, andA is afixed matrix ofconstants.
In three dimensions, an affine function is a plane.
11. This assumption might not be too unrealistic; banks would have the
same, or nearly the same, net currency positions ifthey all used similar
portfolio optimization algorithms to manage exposure.LEVONIANI BANK CAPITAL STANDARDS 11
The relevantpartial derivatives are:
(14a) :: = N ( (1 ~p) + pd2yl2,
Values of the optimal weights can be computed from
equations (15) for realistic values ofN, p, and the ratio d.
What are reasonable choices of parameters? IfN is inter-
preted as the number ofmajor currencies, then pmight be
interpreted as the average correlation coefficient. The vast
bulk of currency exposure for U.S. banks is concentrated
in six major foreign currencies-German mark, Japanese
yen, British pound, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, and
}.\. ..ustralian dollar-suggestinglv = 6. The average-correla-
tion between biweekly changes in dollar exchange rates of
these six currencies (measured over non-overlapping two-
year intervals from 1981 through 1992 as described in
SectionVIII below) ranges from .38 to .56, with amean of
.47. Table 2A presentsillustrative calculations ofw; and
wi based on these parameter values. Besides the six major
foreign currencies, U.S. banks tend to have moderate
exposures in other currencies such as the Italian lira,
French franc and Dutch guilder; to consider the implica-
tions of differences in the number of currency positions,
Table 2B presents optimal weights for N = 9.
Even for agiven combination ofthe parametersNand p,
the accuracy ofthe WAP approximation varies depending
on the NAP/GAP ratio d. Thus, in practice the choice of
weights for WAP should depend on the range of net and
gross positions that regulators aim to fit most closely. For
example, other elements of bank supervision may lead
mostbanksto run foreign exchangebooks that are balanced
ornearlybalanced, sothatthetypicalNAP (andd)is small.
In that case, the choice of weights likely would be made
from the left-most column of Table 2A or of Table 2B.
There are two ways these weights could be used for
capitalregulation. Consider the caseofN= 6, p= .47, and
NAP/GAP= .33. Underone approach, banks would com-
pute theiropen foreign exchange positions as 42 percent of
their net exposure plus 24 percent oftheir gross exposure,
and might be required to have capital equal to at least 4.4
percent of this sum. 12 This is how the Basle foreign
exchange proposal uses WAP in its BAP incarnation. A
second approach would combine the capital ratio with the
weights w;;, and wi; a composite capital charge would be
made against the net position, and an additional charge
would be made against the gross position. In this example,
banks would be required to have at least enough capital to
cover 1.8 percentofnetexposure (4.4percent of0.42) and
















although as exchange rates change randomly overtime d is
likely to vary.
Ifwnand Wg are chosen to make WAPtangenttoP along
the ray defined by NAP/GAP=d, then WAP will be
locally precise, in the sense that WAP will equal P for any
portfolio scale d selected by individual banks. Moreover,
WAP will track changes in risk precisely for local variation
ind, since tangency equates the partial derivatives ofWAP
and.lD with respect to a; first order changes in measured
risk would be the same as first order changes in actual
portfolio risk.
Formally, since d = IN- 2nliN it is possible to rewrite
WAPand P (from equations (3) and (8» as functions ofd
and d, given Nand p:
aWAP ----ax- = Ndwn
Equating (14a) to (14c) and (14b) to (14d) as in (13) allows
solution for the optimal weights w; and wi:









12. The standard deviation oftwo-week rates ofchange over the entire
1981-1992 period for the six majorforeign currencies was 1.46 percent.
Three standard deviations of coverage ('Y = 3) would imply a capital
ratio of about 4.4 percent to be applied against the aggregate open
position.12 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
TABLE2A
OPTIMAL WAP WEIGHTS WITH N = 6
NAP/GAP= 1 NAP/GAP= .67 NAP/GAP= .33 NAP/GAP=O
p wg Wn wg Wn wg wn wg wn
.38 .15 .55 .20 .49 .27 .33 .32 0
.47 .12 .63 .16 .57 .24 .42 .30 0
.56 .09 .70 .13 .66 .20 .51 .27 0
TABLE 2B
OPTIMAL WAP WEIGHTS WITH N = 9





























would correspond to the treatment in the Basle Commit-
tee's equity price risk proposal, the "x plus y" approach.
From (15), the ratio of the WAP weights from the
optimal approximation is:
13. The Basle weights are 0.5 and 0.5, butto evaluate WAP's ability to
track risk across banks and over time only the relative weights matter,
nottheir absolute levels. Since WAP is multipliedbya minimumcapital
ratioto seta standard for capital adequacy, the weights can be scaledup
or down proportionally, with the capital ratio scaled in the opposite
This ratio depends positively on p, N, and Jl. Ifexchange
rates are highly correlated, thenchanges inthe valueoflong
positions tend to be offset by changes in the value of
short positions; net exposure becomes most relevant, and
the optimal w~ is high relative to wi. With alarger number
of foreign currencies, N, diversification eliminates more
portfolio risk for any given gross size ofthe portfolio, and
wi is reduced relative to w~. Finally, as Jl goes to zero
and portfolios become more balanced (NAP goes to zero),
then risk comes to depend mainly on GAP, and the optimal
wi becomes large relative to w~.
TheBasleCommittee'sforeignexchangeproposalplaces






tions ofJl and pfor which the ratio in equation (16) is equal
to one (and the Basle weighting is optimal) for various N.
The graph implies that with pin the range of.35 to .55, the
Basle proposal may be optimal provided bank portfolios
are reasonably balanced (with NAP no greater than about
30 percent ofGAP). The Basle proposal would be optimal
for lower values of p if long and short currency positions
within portfolios tend to be unbalanced. 14
Capital standards based on WAP are fairly clever. They
appear to depend only on the dollar size ofpositions, and
are simple in form; they also appear to ignore correlations
between different exchange rates. However, information
from the variance-covariance matrix is incorporated in the
choice of weights for gross and net exposures: the covari-
ance determines the relative weights, and the variance
scales the weights proportionally.
direction for the appropriate degree ofcoverage. For example, weights
of Wn = .8 and Wg = .4 with a minimum capital ratio of4 percent have
exactly the precision and coverage ofwn =.4, wg = .2, and an 8 percent
standard.
14. These results suggest that the Basle proposal may weight gross
exposure too heavily. However, other risks related to settlement and
delivery may be relatively high in transactions involving currency
exchange. Those risks plausibly depend on gross exposure; if so,
additional capital related to GAP may be warranted.LEVONIAN/ BANK CAPITAL STANDARDS 13
FIGURE 2
PARAMETER COMBINATIONS THAT MAKE




measured at zero (and no capital is required) ifboth NAP
and GAP are zero.
Consideringthesereal-worldwrinkles, therelevantques-
tion is an empirical one: CanWAP bemade approximately
proportionaltothe actual (J"p ?15 Morespecifically, the Basle
CommitteehasproposedBAP, theequallyweightedvariant
of WAP, to gauge exchange rate risk. This section uses a
regression approach to evaluate BAP empirically as an
affine approximation (see footnote 10) to actual foreign
exchangeportfoliorisk, usingdataonexchangeratesandon
banks' foreign exchange positions.
The data on banks' foreign currency positions come
from the FFIEC 035 report, a confidential survey of
currency exposure conducted by federal banking regula-
tors. The format ofthe collected data corresponds closely
to the theoretical specification of the position vector D
above. Forthe FFIEC 035 report, all ofa bank's exposures
in any single currency-including those arising from
loans, deposits, securities and other sources denominated
in foreign currency, both spot and forward-are collapsed
intoa singlehypotheticalposition, eitherlong orshort. The
only divergence from the theoretical model is that the
positions are denominated in units offoreign currency; for
this analysis, they were convertedto U.S. dollars using the
exchange rate prevailing as ofthe reporting date.
Currency positions were taken from the December re-
ports for 1990,1991, and 1992, for all banks in the Twelfth
Federal Reserve District. Virtually all ofthe exposure was
in the six major foreign currencies, so only these are
considered in the analysis. One notable feature of the
FFIEC 035 data is that relatively few banks file the report,
reflecting the fact that many banks have immaterialforeign
exchange exposure; in the Twelfth District, only 15 banks
reportedforeign exchange exposures for 12/90,9banksfor
12/91, and 8 banks for 12/92. Thus, foreign exchange risk
may not be a widespreadconcern, although itmay be large
for some individual banks. The six individual major cur-
rency positions were calculated for each bank, and BAP
was computed from these positions.
Portfolio variances for each bank also were calculated
from the vector ofpositions, based on variance-covariance
matrices of percentage changes in exchange rates. The
FFIEC 035 positions were consideredto betypical portfo-
lios that banks could hold at any time, and applied to I
matrices estimatedfor specificdates tocomputethe portfo-
lio variances as they would have been ifthe portfolios had
15. The theoretical analysis in Section VI investigated the relationship
between WAPand P. Under the assumptions ofthat model, WAP=P
implied <TWAP = <TP' so an analysis ofthe first condition encompassed
















vrn. A TEST OF THE BASLE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE MEASURE
The analysis in the preceding section suggests that BAP
might be expected to work reasonably well in some cases.
However, the model used in that analysis makes highly
stylized assumptions regarding exchange rate processes
and foreign exchange portfolio structures. In practice,
banks do not all have the same ratio ofNAP to GAP, and
may not even be tightly distributed around any particular
ratio. Thus, ratherthan aWAP plane that is tangentalong a
single ray, the optimal policy might be a plane thatleads to
small differences betweenWAP andPfor combinations of
NAP and GAP over some range ofd ratios, perhaps one
minimizing the integral ofthe squareddifference. In addi-
tion, relaxation ofother simplifying assumptions (such as
the special structure of the I matrix) may mean that in
practicethe surface mapping NAP-GAP combinations into
(J"p is less regularin form than the P cone described above.
Thus, actual bankportfolios probably are scatteredaround
on anirregular surface above the NAP-GAPplane, andthe
practicalquestion is whether a WAP approximation can be
constructed to fit these points acceptably well. Requiring
that the result be expressed as a conventional-looking
capitalratio applied to WAP adds an additional constraint,
that the plane should go through the origin, so that risk is14 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
been held at those dates.16 For the matrix estimations, the
1981-1992 period was divided into six two-year subperi-
ods. Two-year subperiods were deemed to be a reasonable
compromise: I is more likely to be stable over shorter
periods, but an estimation period that is too shortproduces
estimates with unacceptably wide confidence intervals. A
series ofnon-overlapping two-weekpercentagechanges in
exchange rates was constructed from actual dollar ex-
change rates \vithin each subperiod for each of the six
major foreign currencies. (The two-week convention, ini-
tiated by the Basle Committee in testing the proposal, is
based on considerations of how rapidly bank portfolio
losses due to exchange rate changes can be recognized
and acted upon by banks or regulators.) Six variance-
covariance matrices (one for each subperiod) were esti-
mated from the percentage changes in exchange rates.
Portfolio standard deviations were estimated as ITp =
[D'ID]lI2, whereeach ofthe observedcurrency portfolios
is characterized by a dollar position vector D. Combining
32 bank portfolios with matrices from six subperiods
yielded a data set with 192 observed pairs of (ITp\t and
BAPit, one for each bank i in period t.
A rough nonparametric test ofthe strength ofthe rela-
tionship between BAP and ITp can be constructed from the
rank correlation ofthetwo variables. At a minimum, BAP
or any other proposed measure of portfolio risk should
yield higher values for higher risk portfolios and lower
values for lower risk portfolios. Calculation ofthe Spear-
man rankcorrelation coefficientindicates that BAPand ITp
are highly rank correlated: The coefficient for the entire
sample is 0.991, significantly greaterthan zero at virtually
any confidence level.
The high rank correlation is encouraging, but BAP
should pass more rigorous tests ifitis to be the foundation
for asimpleyetprecisecapital standard. Inparticular, BAP
should be roughly proportional to the theoretical portfolio
compositionfactorP, thatisP=f3BAP. Theportfoliostand-
ard deviation ITp then would be approximately equal to
ITf3BAP, from equation (9). Thus, in a regression of the
form:
(17) (ITp)it = U + ITf3BAPit + Eit ,
goodness-of-fit shouldbehigh and the coefficient f3 should
bemeasured withlittle error; for BAPto be proportional to
ITp' the coefficient u should equal zero. In addition, itmay
be desirable for f3 to be stable across subperiods. Ifthose
16. The obvious drawback to this approach is that banks' decisions
regarding foreign exchange exposures may depend in part on the
variance-covariance matrix of exchange rates. The empirical impor-
tance ofthis problem is left as an issue for future testing.
conditions are satisfied, then BAP is a simple, propor-
tional, and relatively precise measure offoreign exchange
portfolio risk. For estimation, the exchange rate standard
deviation IT is replaced with the average standard devi-
ation, averaged across the major foreign currencies for
each subperiod. Denoting the variance-covariance matrix
for subperiod t as It, the average volatility is computed as
the square root ofthe average variance for each subperiod,
nr iT - '\ /tra"e(~\/h ~",tt;...n-" """"tal C't"...r1"rrl than ra
V.l. Vt~ V u '"' '~tl'v. UVl.L.1J..l5 u. ""u.yu. .1. cn,u..l1uaJ.u \.u,",u .1\ ......
quires an estimate of 0', but this average volatility is
constant across banks, and in practice developing a repre-
sentativeestimate shouldnotbehard. A coverageratioof"y
would be achieved by setting a minimum capital ratio of
C="YO'f3.
Two types ofheteroskedasticity are likely in estimating
(17). Oneis relatedto the scaleofbankportfolios: the error
variance is likely to be higher for larger portfolios. A
simple correction for scale-related heteroskedasticity is to
divide through by BAP before estimating, creating a
transformed equation with errors that are no longerpropor-
tional to BAP. The second type relates to the subperiods
used to estimate the matrices of exchange rate variances
and covariances: In theory, the ability ofBAP to match P
depends on p for a given number of currencies, and
exchange rate correlation coefficients vary across the two-
year subperiods. This second source ofheteroskedasticity
is handled through weighted least squares estimation,
allowing the variance of the regression residuals to vary
across subperiods.
With the correction for scale-related heteroskedasticity,
the equation to be estimated is:
(18) B(ITAPp)it = u-AI + O'tf3 + uit ,
it B Pit
where i is an index for the portfolio, t indexes the sample
subperiod, and uit = Ei/BAPit. Estimation results are
shown in the first column ofTable 3, with standard errors
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. R2 is the
usual goodness'-of-fit statistic corrected for degrees of
freedom, and the sum of squared residuals is reported as
SSR.J7
The results show that most ofthe conditions for use of
BAP as the basis for a capital standard are satisfied
(intertemporal stability is addressed separately below).
The estimate ofu is insignificantly differentfrom zero and
17. The same regression was run without division by BAP, yielding
coefficient estimates that were qualitatively similarto those reported in
thetable. Inspectionoftheresidualsfrom bothregressionsindicatedthat
scale-related heteroskedasticity was in fact an issue in the untrans-
formed regression, and that dividing each observation by BAP largely
eliminated the problem.TABLE 3








the standard error of 13 is relatively small, so CTp can
be assumed proportional to BAP with relative impunity
(given 0'). The fit of the regression as measured by the
adjustedR2 is high, perhaps remarkably so considering the
simplicity ofthe BAP approach for measuring market risk.
The second column presents the results with the intercept
restricted to zero to illustrate the relatively minoreffect on
13 offorcing CTD to be proportional to BAP.
In equation"(18) and Table 3, the slope and the intercept
ofthe relationship between BAP andthe portfolio variance
are restricted to be the same in each of the sample sub-
periods. These restrictions on the coefficients must be
relaxed ifthe stability of 13 is to be evaluated. An alterna-
tive regression is:
(CTp )it _ ~ _1_ ~ _
(19) BAP. - t~I at BAP. + t~I CTt l3t + Uit
It It
In this form, restrictions on the coefficients at and I3t can
be tested with standard F tests.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for equation (19). In
the first column, both intercept and slope are allowed to
differ for each subperiod. (In effect these are six separate
regressions, one for each period, since the error variances
also differ across subperiods.) None of the intercepts is
significantly different from zero at the 5 percentlevel. The
slope coefficients range from 0.82 for the 1985-1986
period to 0.94 for the 1981-1982 period. In the second
column of the table, 13 is restricted to be the same for all
subperiods. The restricted coefficient estimate is 0.88; in
this form, a is significantly different from zero for the
1981-1982 and 1989-1990 subperiods. An F test ofthe 13
restrictions yields a test statistic of 2.91, with 5 and 180
degrees of freedom; this value lies between the 95th
percentileoftheF distribution (2.26) and the 99th percen-
tile (3.12). Thus, although 13 is not truly stable, it is not
terribly unstable. Additional testing reveals that the ]983-
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (19)
No RESTRICTIONS 13 RESTRICTED U RESTRICTED
U81- 82 0.03 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
U83- 84 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
U85- 86 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
U87- 88 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
U89-90 0.03 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
U91- 92 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
1381-82 0.94 0.88 0.96
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
1383-84 0.83 0.88 0.82
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
1385-86 0.82 0.88 0.81
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
1387-88 0.92 0.88 0.93
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
1389-90 0.94 0.88 0.95
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
1391-92 0.91 0.88 0.89
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
R2 0.961 0.970 0.959
SSR 12.66 13.69 13.22
1984 and 1985-1986 periods are statistically different
from the other subperiods; an F test fails to reject the
hypothesis that 13 takes one value (0.82) for 1983-1986,
and a second value (0.93) for the remainder ofthe sample.
The fact that even the statistically different coefficients for
the 1983-1986 period are in the rough vicinity of the
other estimates suggests that the Basle approach may be
workable.
The third column of Table 4 shows the effects of
restricting the intercept across subperiods. As would be
expected from the first column ofthe table, an F test does16 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
not reject this restriction. The restricted intercept is not
significantly different from zero, making a BAP-based
proportionalcapital standardfeasible. Theprimaryconclu-
sion from the regressions is that BAP is approximately
proportional to P. The F tests imply that the factor ofpro-
portionality f3 is fairly stable over time, and that the value
ofP is typically about 80 to 95 percent ofBAP.
One concern in moving from equation (19) to the con-
struction ofpractical capital standards is that ~ is the factor
ofproportionality betweenP andBAP, whereas the ratioof
up to BAP at timet is actuallyatf3r Thus, evidence that f3t
is fairly stable might be of limited relevance, since the
combinationatf3t may not be. Additional regressions were
run with at set equal to 1.0 in both (18) and (19), a
restriction which effectively forces the coefficient f3 to
incorporate the effects of exchange rate volatility u, and
therefore permits direct tests of the stability ofatf3t. The
results were not materially different from Tables 3 and 4,
and so are not reported; goodness-of-fit was comparable,
the intercepts were still insignificant, and the stability
results for the slope coefficientwere the same. As would be
expected, the values of the f3 coefficients were higher,
reflecting the fact that they include aa factor that averages
1.46 over the entire sample period.
Using the restricted estimate of f3 = 0.88, the portfolio
standard deviation is (J"p=0.88aBAP. Based on the aver-
age 0', capital equal to 1.28 percent (88 percent of1.46) of
the typical bank's BAP is sufficient to cover one standard
deviation of changes in the value of the bank's aggregate
foreign currency portfolio. Ifthree standard deviations of
coverage is considered desirable (a level which would
cover all but 0.13 percent of the probable losses under
a normal distribution), then the minimum capital ratio
should be 3.85 percent ofBAP. The Basle Committee has
proposed applying an 8 percent ratio to BAP. Even taking
thehighestestimateof f3 from Table 4 (0.96from the 1981-
1982 subperiod with a restricted) and the highest O't(1.86
percentfor 1985-1986), threestandarddeviations ofcover-
age would correspond to a 5.36 percent capital ratio.
Under these extreme assumptions, 8 percent capital pro-
vides about 4.5 standard deviations of coverage. Thus,
while BAP appears to be a reasonably precise measure of
risk, the proposed level ofcapital coverage appears to be
very conservative. Such an apparently excessive degree of
coverage might be justified as compensating for errors in
the BAP approximation. Alternatively, regulators may
want to allow for non-normality in the statistical distribu-
tion ofexchange ratechanges; stochastic processes may in-
corporate discrete random jumps, or distributions may be
leptokurtic (fat-tailed).
IX. SOME COMMENTS
ON THE OrHER MARKET RISKS
A similarly detailed analysis ofthe equity and traded debt
(or interest rate) components of the Basle Committee's
marketriskproposals is beyondthe scopeofthis paper, and
is deferred for future research. However, a few observa-
tions can be made about particular aspects ofthese other
drafts.
As noted in Section V, the Basle proposal for equity
price risk gives gross exposure less weight in diversified
portfolios than in undiversified portfolios. The analysis in
Section VII indicates that this difference in weighting may
be appropriate: For WAP to approximate P, NAP should
get more weight relative to GAP when the number of
positions is large. (Recall from (16) that w~/w; increases
with N.) The equity proposal also gives GAP less relative
weight than it is given in the foreign exchange proposal.
Such adifference in weights is appropriateifthe numberof
different issues in a diversified portfolio of equities is
larger than the number. of currencies in a typical bank
currency portfolio, a reasonable assumption. Finally, cal-
culations ofreturn variances for the 30 stocks in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average indicate that stock returns tend to
be more volatile than exchange rate changes. Thus the
higher coverage levels implicit in the equity proposal may
be desirable (the composite capital weights on GAP and
NAP are 4 percent and 8 percent respectively for diver-
sified portfolios, and 8 and 8 for undiversified portfolios,
comparedto 4 percentand4 percentfor foreign exchange).
The traded-debt-instruments proposal also seems at
least superficiallyin accordwiththe conceptual model. As
discussedin Section V, the netting/disallowance process in
the proposal effectively applies WAP in stages. WAP is a
simple measure ofportfolio risk for any portfolio, includ-
ing sub-portfolios of, for example, Zone 2 (medium-term)
securities. Thus, this proposal can be construed as an
attempt to compute simple but accurate measures ofposi-
tion for various sub-portfolios, then combine these in a
building-block approach to obtain a measure of total
interest rate risk for the debt portfolio. In practice, the
traded-debtframeworkmay provideabettermeasureofrisk
than either the foreign exchange or the equity market
risk components; both ofthose proposals use a single pair
of weights on gross and net exposures for all portfolios,
whereasthedebtproposal ineffectpermits some flexibility
in the NAP/GAP weighting. Allowing the weights to vary
somewhat according to the composition of a bank's debt
portfolio could provide superior results. Another desirable
feature of the proposal is that differing volatilities of
maturity bands are recognized directly, through the pre-
multiplication by risk weights; in contrast, the foreign ex-change proposal does not account for the fact that some
exchange rates tend to vary more than others.
As equation (5) shows, the weights on gross and net
in the interest rate risk proposal are determined by the
disallowance factors; higherdisallowance factors give rela-
tively more weight to GAP versus NAP. Section VII
indicates that an emphasis on GAP is desirable if the
correlationsbetweeninstrumentsinaportfolio (orsubport-
folio) are low. The Basle Conunittee's proposed disallow-
ance factors are lowest within maturity bands, somewhat
higher across bands within a single zone, and higher still
across zones, with the highest disallowance factor (1.5)
applying to netting between the short-term and long-term
zones. These differences appear to correspond to the
empirically observed patternofcorrelations betweeninter-
est rate changes across the term structure. Thus, the
general pattern ofdisallowances seems roughly appropri-
ate, although a more confident conclusion would require
careful analysis ofthe entire proposal.18
Future research should consider applying regression
analysis to both the equity and interest rate proposals, as
was done inthis paperfor empirical analysis ofthe foreign
exchange proposal. One difficulty is that data on bank
positions with respect to these other market risks are
inferior to the FFIEC 035 currency data. Central banks in
various countries have done some confidential analyses of
this type.
X. CONCLUSION
The recent proposals from the Basle Committee for incor-
porating market risks into risk-based capital standards are
coherent and sensible, embodying a unified underlying
theme: The minimum adequate level of bank capital is
computed as a ratio of capital to risk exposure, with
exposure measured as a weighted sum of gross and net
positions from a hypothetical composite portfolio for each
18. Federal banking regulators in the United States have proposed a
somewhat different approach to measuring interest rate risk for capital
adequacy. The U.S. proposal is similarto the Basle proposalinthe con-
structionofa hypothetical portfolio brokeninto time bands, and the use
of risk weights based on potential changes in the value of debt
instruments when rates change. However, the U.S. proposal makes no
use of "disallowance factors," implicitly setting 8 to zero. As demon-
strated above, 8 = 0 makes WAP equivalent to NAP, with no weight on
gross exposure; this is in effect the approach taken by U.S. regulators,
with long exposures in any time band netted against shortexposures in
any other band. As also shown above, NAP is the correct measure if
p=1, thatis, ifrates inall timebands areperfectlycorrelated. The Basle
approach using disallowances can be viewed as a simple way to
incorporate the fact that correlations across the yield curve are not
perfect.
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bank. The conceptual model developed in this paper sug-
gests that this approach can produce capital standards that
are reasonably accurate, and at the same time are simple
enough to be practical. A weighting of gross and net
exposures (the WAP approach) can be viewed as an affine
approximation (the equivalent of linear in several dimen-
sions) to the true portfolio variance, and hence can link
capital standards fairly tightly to portfolio risk in order
to prevent 'failure probabilities from reaching excessive
levels. A system based on a weighted root sumofsquares
of gross and net would be more precise, but also more
complex.
Empirical testing ofthe foreign exchange proposal was
based on exchange rate data for the six major non-U.S.
currencies from 1981-1992and a recent samplingofactual
U.S. bankcurrency positions. The results indicate that the
measurementframework proposedby theBasleCommittee
tracks foreign exchange rate risk remarkably well, captur-
ing over 95 percent of the total variation in foreign ex-
change risk across the sample ofbanks. However, the level
of coverage implicit in the 8 percent capital ratiomay be
somewhat high.
Conclusions regarding the equity price risk and interest
rate risk proposals are tentative, since a detailed empirical
analysis was not conducted in this paper. However, an
initial reading of the other two market risk proposals
against the background of the conceptual model suggests
that they incorporate a number ofappealing features.
Unfortunately, neither the common thread running
through the market risk proposals nor the desirable proper-
ties ofthe WAP approach have been articulated clearly in
the consultative documents released for public comment.
The equity risk proposal is the only one of the three that
explicitly describes the capital charge as a weighting of
gross and net exposures, and that presentation is muddied
by a discussion of "general risk" and "specific risk" that
has little to do with the analytical merits of WAP. The
interest rate risk proposal, as described above, uses a
system ofnetting with "disallowances" to accomplish the
weighting, which obscures the fact that the proposal is
fundamentally a WAP calculation. The foreign exchange
draft does point out that the proposal reflects the assump-
tion of "some, but not perfect, correlation between the
movements of different exchange rates" (Basle Commit-
tee, 1993, p.39). However, the aggregate foreign exchange
position calculation is described as "the sum of the short
positions orthe sum ofthe long positions, whichever is the
greater" (ibid, p.38); as shown in Section IV, this is
equivalent to equally weighted WAP, but the equivalence
may not be obvious.
The BasleCommittee is international, and the proposed
standards are to apply internationally. This paperevaluates18 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
N (N(N-1) ) I d.d. = d2 . - n(N-n)





Substituting this into the expression for the portfolio vari-
ance in (AI) gives:
(A3) (J; = (J2d2N + (J2d2(N(N-1) - 4n(N- n»)p
= (J2d2N + (J2d2(N- 2n)Z - N»)p
= (J2d2N (1- p) + (J2d2(N- 2n)2 p
as asserted in the text.
The second term involves the double summation of
products ofpositions in all pairs offoreign currencies. The
total numberofpairings ina setofN objects isN(N-1)/2,











If the positions were either all long or all short, then the
termsinthedouble summationwouldsumtod2N(N-'1)/2.
However, by assumption there are n short positions and
N- n long positions. The number of pairings ofx objects
withy objects isxy; hence the numberofshort-longpairsis
n(N- n). Itfollows thatthe numberofdidj = dZ pairs is not
the maximumnumberN(N-1)/2, butratherN(N-1)/2-




the proposals solely from a U.S. perspective; results for
other countries might differ. Parallel analyses have been,
and continue to be, pursued at other central banks around
the world. Obviously, the final form of the market risk
standards will be the resultofinternationalnegotiation and
agreement, and agreement will depend on how well the
proposals meet the needs ofthe many countries involved.
The Basle Committee also has suggestedthatthe standards
could be applied to other types of financial firms, such as
securities houses andinsurancecompanies, ifregulators in
thoseindustries agree. Introducinganinterindustrydimen-
sion adds to the challenge of reaching a consensus, and
complicates any complete analysis of the market risk
proposals.
As a final note, throughout the Basle documents (and
this paper) each of the many types of risk-including
credit risk, exchange rate risk, equity price risk, and
interest rate risk-is considered and treated separately
from the others. Such a presumption of separability may
not be realistic in view of the likely interactions among
these various sources of risk. Ideally, capital regulations
shouldconsideralltypes ofrisksimultaneouslyin aunified
framework. However, breaking the capital adequacy prob-
leminto more manageablepieces may bethe only practical
approach, and separability may be a workable approxima-
tion. The possibledamage done by this assumption should
be the subject of future research.
The crux is evaluation ofthe summation terms. Note that
by assumption each ofthe di is eitherd (forlong positions)
or-d (for shorts). Clearly d'f=d2 for either type ofposi-
tion, so the first summation is simply d2N.
This appendix describes one of a number of ways to
demonstrate the transition from equation (6) to equation





(J2 = (J2 I d7 + 2(J2p I I d·d· .
P i=l I i=l j=i+l I J
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